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Insecurity at sea is among the modern challenges affecting the maritime industry as 
characterized by piracy, armed robbery, illicit fishing, drugs and human trafficking, 
and pollution of the marine environment, among others. Terrorism, piracy, armed 
robbery has particularly had adverse impact in international trade and global security. 
 
Recently, the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden remain hot spots for armed 
robbery and piracy against commercial ships. In relation to this, both the global 
organizations and coastal governments operating around this region have established 
different efforts in attempts to enhance security and safety of ships and crew. The 
countries in this region also derive a significant proportion of their revenues from the 
blue economy, including tourism, fishing, and drilling of minerals, among other 
industrial activities at sea. 
 
The countries in the region have developed and become members of regional and 
international agreements in attempt to enhance security. This dissertation has explored 
the effectiveness of some of these agreements in enhancing maritime security, 
particularly the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the Djibouti Code of Conduct 
(DCoC). In the process, the paper has explored the existing national and international 
legal framework in which the above treaties are based. The literature review section 
has been based on systematic analysis of the existing knowledge regarding the 
maritime industry, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. 
 
The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden region have been explored based on 
how it uses the two tools to combat insecurity. The efforts of DCoC and CMF have 
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1.1 Background and context 
The area around the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean has a busy and thriving 
maritime industry with busy ports and international trading zones. This requires the 
establishment of effective maritime security forces to protect the maritime vessels and 
personnel from different forms of insecurities including piracy, kidnapping, and armed 
robbery. Additionally, maritime security is paramount, considering the growing 
importance of oceans and related marine environment to humanity in the globalized 
world (Swastika, 2018). In fact, apart from providing platforms for the transport of 
large volumes of commodities, oceans and seas serve as important sources of 
livelihood and food both for those in the region and globally via fisheries and tourism. 
Therefore, security and order in these waters is an indirect source of wealth, facilitates 
multiple activities on land, and is important for sustainable maritime wealth generation 
and preservation of the ecosystem. Unfortunately, the security around the Indian ocean 
continue to be threatened by growing criminal and illegal activities, especially armed 
robbery and piracy targeted at international ships operating through the area. 
 
Recently, global organizations and researchers have ranked insecurity caused by 
armed robbers and pirates as the main threat to seaborne trade in the recent era. For 
decades, the region has relied on IMO and related agreements, associations, treaties, 
and instruments to strengthen security efforts (Swastika, 2018). Countries within the 
region are also signatories to different international maritime organizations and 
treaties. Usually, all the organizations and treaties are targeted towards reducing the 
risks of insecurity affecting the maritime tourism and transport to improve 
international cooperation and trade. In their effort to safeguard the maritime industry 
and other domestic interests, the countries within the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian 
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Ocean region have recently became signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct 
(DCoC) and Combined Maritime Force (CMF). 
 
1.1.2 History of Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) 
The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) denotes a maritime partnership involving 
multiple international bodies whose goal is to ensure that the International Rules Based 
Order (IRBO) are upheld. The CMF is involved in promoting security and ensuring 
stability and prosperity of member states in the high seas, especially along the shipping 
lanes (Combined maritime Forces, 2020). The Combined Maritime Force mainly 
concentrate on preventing piracy, ensuring safety in the marine environment by 
fighting illegal non-state actors, counter narcotics, enhancing regional cooperation, 
counter smuggling, and bringing together regional and various stakeholders to increase 
their capabilities to enhance stability and security. Additionally, the CMF may also 
help during the humanitarian and environmental crises if requested by the affected 
parties. The Combined Maritime Force composes of three task forces including 
Counter piracy force (CTF 151), Maritime Security Operations outside the Arabian 
Gulf (CFT 150), and Maritime Security Operations inside the Arabian Gulf (CFT 152). 
There are 33 countries that are part to the CMF, including: Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Portugal, Qatar, UAE, United Kingdom, United States and Yemen, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines (Combined 
maritime Forces, 2020). Member countries are united towards safeguarding the free 
flow of ships and business, preventing illegal activities, and increasing maritime 
security. The role of each member country differs depending on its resource capacity 
and the availability of such as resources. 
 
1.1.3 History of Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) is an international tool geared towards 
safeguarding waterways in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden from 
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robbery and related piracy of commercial ships. The DCoC was established in 2009 
and the member countries include Egypt, Eritrea, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Mauritius, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Jordan, Yemen, the Maldives, Comoros, and 
Sudan (IMO, 2020). The main goal of the DCoC is to increase sharing of intelligence 
and overall collaboration to prevent armed robbery and piracy, which had become a 
major issue along the international waters of the Indian Ocean. Member states are 
expected to monitor and share intelligence that can help to capture and prosecute 
individuals and groups involved in piracy and other illicit activities. The member 
countries are also required to facilitate the seizing of suspected ships and interdiction 
of suspected perpetrators (IMO, 2020). To ensure ease and increase its effectiveness, 
the DCoC has established certain guidelines and protocols that are used to select 
experts to participate in their missions. DCoC has centers situated in multiple member 
nations including Tanzania, Kenya, and Yemen. 
 
1.2 Justification 
Contemporary economies tend to depend heavily on international maritime transport 
as a key pillar of international trade between countries, trade blocks and continents. 
The western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are important Maritime areas 
characterized by large volumes of commercial ships, which has attracted different 
forms crime and illegal activities over the years. Therefore, the countries in this region 
require an effective maritime force and collaboration to prevent and address incidences 
of maritime crimes. Multiple international laws as outlined under IMO guide the 
management of waterways including the protection of maritime vessels and personnel 
through the territorial waters. Each nation sharing ocean and seawaters is also charged 
with the obligation of providing security for the vessels travelling legally through their 
territories. Failure to provide the necessarily security could have immense negative 
consequences to trade and other maritime activities such as fishing. The fact that a 
single country may not have enough resources to guarantee adequate security around 
it territories, forming an organization or security force becomes necessarily. For 
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instance, the area within the Indian Ocean has become a major spot for pirates targeting 
large ships. In order to protect the vessels, crew and cargo traversing the Western 
Indian Ocean and Red Sea, countries within the region established the Combined 
Maritime Force in 2009 (Brewster, 2016). The force was based on multiple resolutions 
passed by the United Nations Security Council in regards to involving International 
naval forces in preventing and stopping piracy and armed robbery of ships within the 
area.  
 
The International Maritime Organization further pushed for the establishment of the 
DCoC to provide a legal reference point for nations and states around the western 
Indian Ocean waters, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. The effect of the DCoC 
provisions in minimizing criminal activities around the Somalia territorial waters is 
massive considering that the cases of piracy have reduced within the area in the last 
few years. For instance, only less than five piracy attempts and attacks have been 
documented in the last 8 years compared to over 100 incidences documented in 2011. 
The creation of DCoC was based on a similar inter-governmental agreement 
established in Asia called the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery (RECAAP) (Brewster, 2016). While DCoD only involves nations 
around the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden region, the Combined Maritime Force 
involves countries across different continents. Additionally, the Combined Maritime 
Force mainly concentrate on preventing piracy, ensuring safety in the marine 
environment by fighting illegal non-state actors, counter narcotics, enhancing regional 
cooperation, counter smuggling, and bringing together regional and various 
stakeholders to increase their capabilities to enhance stability and security. While the 
DCoC and the CMF share some similarities, their framework and mode of operation 
differ significantly. By looking at the key principles and constituent of the DCoC and 
CMF, this dissertation hopes to determine the effectiveness of each entity and provide 
best recommendation to improve maritime security within the region under study. 
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1.3 Main Objectives 
The key goal of this paper is to study the role of the DCoC and the Combined Maritime 
Force (CMF) based on their purpose and mode of operations in enhancing maritime 
security. The paper hopes to achieve the following objectives: 
 To determine the interrelationship between CMF and DCoC 
 To determine the role of DCoC and CMF in their respective areas of operations  
 To determine the impact of CMF and DCoC’s ability to respond to maritime 
insecurity 
 To assess the strengths and weaknesses of CMF &DCoC 
1.4 Research Questions 
In the context of the CMF and DCoC agreements, there is a need to carry out a 
comprehensive examination to determine their effectiveness in enhancing security in 
the area under study. The comparative analysis will use the available data to determine 
the number of armed robbery attacks, piracy and other forms of insecurities targeted 
on ships and other maritime vessels in the region the CMF and DCoC has helped to 
prevent or stop since their implementation. This is very important towards improving 
overall maritime security in the region and across the globe. The key research 
questions the dissertation hopes to answer are: 
1. Can regional agreements such as DCoC and CMF help tackle the existing and 
emerging security threats in an ever-changing maritime environment?  
2. What role does the DCoC and CMF agreement play in ensuring the stability of 
the region where members or signatories have varying national and economic 
interests?  
3. What steps and legislations could be established to facilitate safe and conflict-
free maritime activities in the region?  
4. How have the CMF and DCoC been able to align its goals with the domestic 
and international obligations of its members or signatories?  
5. Are CMF and DCoC efficient and effective in supporting security effort of its 
signatories and which between them is more suited to protecting the regions 




2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Maritime Agreements and Tools to Curb Insecurity in the 21st Century 
According to the Indian Ocean Commission (2019), the Indian Ocean is an important 
geopolitical center that links trade paths in the Asia-Pacific region, Africa, Australia, 
and the Middle East. The territory also possesses substantial amounts of regional, 
national, and common valuable maritime resources that have contributed to the ever-
increasing insecurity issues including illegal fishing, piracy, trafficking of narcotics, 
weapons, people, and other illegal things (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The 
strategic value of the region is immense considering that it covers several continents. 
According to CRIMARIO (2018), the Indian Ocean starts from the Southern part of 
Africa, the Suez Canal to the north, and Antarctica in the South, and Australia and 
Indonesian archipelago to the East. According to the International statistics, at least 40 
percent of gas and half of global oil shipments are moved through the Indian Ocean. 
Ports around the region handle at least 50 percent of global container shipments, which 
translates to over 25 percent of the global trade (Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2016). Also, 
in abundance are vital mineral resources including nickel, uranium, fishing stocks, 
aluminium, and cobalt. Therefore, enhancing security in the Indian Ocean, especially 
areas such as the Gulf of Aden, Bab el Mandeb, Malacca, and the Straits of Hormuz is 
strategically important for the international flow of goods and services (Kraska, 2009). 
This explains the numerous cooperation agreements and increased naval activities in 




Figure 1  Map of Western Indian Ocean 
Source: hptt://www.africacenter.org/ 
 
The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden also borders countries that has 
experienced civil wars and related terrorist activists for decades including Sudan and 
Somalia. These countries are adversely affected by lack of political stability due to 
limited capacity to develop and enforce maritime policies. Consequently, illegal trade 
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and related criminal activities have thrived in different parts of the region (Kraska, 
2009).  The fall of the government of the republic of Somalia, for instance, has largely 
contributed to the rise in piracy and armed robbery, which is very rampant around the 
coastline of Somalia. The insecurities posed by the criminals operating in the Somalia 
coastline have gradually extended to other parts of the Indian Ocean. Multiple nations 
with economic and political interests such as India, China, Russia, and the United 
States have established naval centers within the area to counter these criminal activities 
(Cordner, 2018). The security threats have also led to the establishment of several 
agreements and instruments among the countries within the region and those with 
interests in the area. 
 
According to Cordner (2018), there are multiple treaties and conventions that date as 
back as a century ago covering various maritime issues including illegal fishing and 
protection of the environment. Other conventions are based on International guidelines 
rather than regional cooperation. For example, the United Nations Conventions on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an important global treaty that consists of more than 160 
nations (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The treaty covers multiple maritime 
security protocols in maritime terrorism, piracy, smuggling, environmental protection, 
and illegal fishing. The Law of Sea is a detailed agreement that countries must 
integrate in their national or regional security systems to ensure security in their 
maritime territories in collaboration with the United Nations agencies (Bueger & 
Stockbruegger, 2016). Other global instruments and treaties that were developed or 
revised in the recent decades and meant to improve maritime security in the Western 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden include: 
1) The Security Council Resolutions 1816 (2008) and 1772 (2007), which were 
derived from the United Nations’ Law of the Sea and meant to fight armed robbery 
and piracy around the Somalia coastline (IMO, 2020). 
2) The Convention for the Suppression of illegal activities, which is aimed at ensuring 
safe navigation of ships, commonly known as the Rome Convention of 1988 
(Kraska, 2009). 
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3) International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code of Practice for the Investigation 
of the Crimes of Armed Robbery and Piracy against ship, and 
4) Safety of Life at Sea (SOALS) (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). 
2.1.1 Basis of the Agreements and Instruments 
Maritime Agreements among countries in The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of 
Aden territory encompass nations such as Mauritius, Madagascar, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Comoros, Seychelles, the French foreign territory of Reunion, 
Mozambique, and Somalia (CRIMARIO, 2018). The territory is a key international 
center harbouring important naval activities and geopolitical interactions among 
nations. 
 
2.1.2 A Fact Sheet of the Western Indian Ocean 
 The overall natural resources of the Western Indian Ocean are projected 
to have an economic value exceeding 3000 billion US dollars (Indian 
Ocean Commission, 2019) 
 The waters have immense value to the human and animal lives in the area  
 The yearly Gross Marine Product of the Western Indian Ocean is 
estimated at over 20 billon US dollars 
 Fisheries make up the largest wealth generator in the region, estimated 
at 40 percent of the overall natural resources of the region, which 
translates to more than 130 billion US dollars (CRIMARIO, 2018). 
 The region has more than 60 million human inhabitancies just around its 
coastal areas 
 The population of people in majority of the nations with the area is 
growing rapidly, hence the development of its coastal zones is expected 
to grow immensely in the coming years  
 The major contributors of development in the Western Indian Ocean and 
the Gulf of Aden are service, construction, mining, and extractive zones, 
especially the tourism and hospitality industries, and  
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The Western Indian Ocean region enjoys a dense variety of animal and plant 
species (IMO, 2020). 
 
2.13 Security issues in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
According to Baruah (2018), the Western Indian Ocean has been experiencing its own 
share of diverse, interlinked and complex traditional and non-traditional security 
issues. The act of armed robbery and piracy has reduced since increased multi-national 
naval operations around the East African territories since 2013 (Baruah, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the region is still susceptible to periodic and radical terrorism conducted 
by Somali pirates and international terrorism organizations such as Al-Shabaab. The 
explosion of piracy and armed robbery against ships between 2008 and 2011 within 
the Western Indian Ocean zones and in the Gulf of Aden have revealed that insecurities 
at sea are interlinked and that the ability of individual states in the region are 
inadequate to deter maritime crimes and to attain the developmental potential of the 
region. Pirates from Somali have been conducting successful attacks against trade 
ships and other vessels around the Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar, and Seychelles areas 
(Baruah, 2018). The insecurities in the region, which are not limited to piracy, 
terrorism, or organized crimes, are evidently connected to political instabilities and 
underdevelopment on land. The countries within the Western Indian Ocean regions 
have tried different approaches to counter terrorism activities including enforcing 
sanctions. However, most of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) activities in the 
area are carried out by international stakeholders and actor rather than by regional 
actors (Bateman, 2016). 
 
2.1.4 International Cooperation against insecurity in the WIO and Gulf of Aden 






MASE Programme The programme to Promote Regional Maritime Security (MASE) was 
inaugurated in Mauritius in 2010. The MASE is operated under the partnership 
with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and European 
Union (EU) (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The programme is fully 
financed by the European Union and jointly enforced by the East African 
Community (EAC), the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Baruah, 2018). The main 
goal of MASE is to reinforce the capacity of the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Eastern and Southern Africa regions to ensure maritime security as part of the 
Regional Action Plan and Strategy against piracy (Bueger & Stockbruegger, 
2016). 
Jeddah amendment 
to the Djibouti 
Code of Conduct 
(DCoC+) 
 In 2017, a high-level delegation met in the city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with 
the main goal of amending the Djibouti code of conduct (DCoC). The updated 
version recognizes the importance of the Blue economy such as seafaring, 
shipping, tourism, and fisheries in creating sustainable development of the local 
and regional economies, stability, creating employment, and food 
security (Indian Ocean Commission, 2019). The new version is founded on the 
initial code of conduct adopted in 2009 and emphasizes on the need for full 
cooperation between signatory nations towards preventing transitional 
maritime terrorism, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other 
organized crimes. One of the most important clauses contained in the (DCoC+) 
is the willingness of the signatory states to establish and enforce a national plan 
to facilitate growth of the maritime sector and ensure a sustainable maritime-
based economy that is capable of producing stability, revenue and employment 
(Baruah, 2018). The meeting at Jeddah involved different key stakeholders 
derived from the original DCoC signatory nations together with observers from 
East African Standby Force (ASF), European Union, France (Reunion), 






AIMS 2050 is an attempt by the African Union to play a larger role in ensuring 
the stability of its waters for the benefit of its people. The plan is geared towards 
increasing the economic benefits derived from the Africa’s inland waterways, 
seas, and Oceans by creating a flourishing maritime economy and tapping the 
maximum potential of the blue economy activities in a sustainable way. The 
continent’s overall coastline is estimated at over 26000 nautical miles, 
including several islands (Baruah, 2018). More than 35 African territories are 
island or coastal countries while over 50 of its ports are heavily involved in 
international trade through cargo and container handling. Although the number 
of ships owned by Africans is merely 2 percent of the global ship population, 
which translate to less than 1% gross tonnage, the ports of Africa receive at 
least 6 percent of global water-based cargo traffic and an estimated three 
percent of global container handling (Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2016).  
 The African Union is in the process of enforcing the 2050 AIMS 
strategy in partnership with the international, regional, and local regulatory 
frameworks.  Evidently, the AIMS are quite a huge undertaking, but its success 
will increase the viability of Africa’s maritime environment, which will 
translate to immense growth (Baruah, 2018). Undivided commitment and 
increase partnership and coordination between member nations, regional 
mechanisms, local communities, RECs, and the larger global community are 
needed. Additionally, maritime policy-makers claims that AIMS as a detailed 
strategy will help to harness the wealth found within the African waters through 
enhanced maritime governance, which will in turn improve the security 
situation in the Western Indian Ocean region (Brewster, 2016).  
 
Djibouti Code of 
Conduct (DCoC) 
The DCoC is focused on preventing and fighting Armed Robbery and Piracy 
against maritime vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean. The 
code was developed in 2009 and comprises of 20 nations as listed above 
(Baruah, 2016). The code of conduct offers a model for capacity building in the 
region, especially in regards to reducing incidences of piracy. The DCoC 
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Table 1. Nature of cooperation in WIO region 
Source: Different security agreements in the Western Indian Ocean region elaborated by the author. 
 
2.15 African littorals security partners in the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden   
According to Baruah (2018), India’s policy makers and related experts have seen 
it important for their country to increase its influence in the Western Indian 
Ocean maritime region by collaborating with the local states to increase 
maritime security. Hence, India’s emphasize on increasing its cooperation with 
Western Indian Ocean’s littorals in maritime issues is of greater importance 
because its strategic location and abundant of untapped maritime resources 
(Baruah, 2018). East African littorals that are rich in natural resources are 
increasingly focusing on their blue economy around the Indian Ocean to help 
attain sustainable development and growth. Countries such as Mauritius, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Comoros, Seychelles, Madagascar, Somalia, and 
Mozambique have become signatories to the 1997’s Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), currently referred as the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (Baruah, 2016). Additionally, India has 
become an important maritime security partner for multiple African lit toral 
nations through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which was 
established in 2008 (CRIMARIO, 2018). The IONS comprise of six African 
nations, namely Tanzania, South Africa, Seychelles, Kenya, Mozambique, and 
Mauritius. From the IONS document, India decision to collaborate with these 
African states was mainly motivated by the deteriorating security in the Western 
Indian Ocean regions, especially after the surge of piracy and armed robbery of 
ships. A similar proactive strategy in India aimed at improving the maritime 
security in African waters is also found under its Maritime Strategy Report of 
2015, which also details several areas of cooperation (Baruah, 2018). 
 




2.1.6 CMF and DCoC’s efforts in the region 
 
2.1.6.1 Mission and Vision of CMF and DCoC 
Mission 
 Promote capacity building to help develop maritime sector and minimize or 
even stop threats of armed robbery and piracy 
 Respond to humanitarian and environmental issues under the request of 
member states 
 Enhance overall stability and security of maritime environment in the region 
(Benbow, 2015).  
Vision 
 To carryout security operations to safeguard maritime resources 
 To increase stability in the region, especially in regards to the development of 
the blue economy 
 To facilitate increase collaboration among member states 
 To provide a framework to help members to adapt to changing maritime 
environment (Benbow, 2015) 
The CMF and DCoC’s security strategy towards the WIO and the Gulf of Aden is 
based on several principles including training, hydrographic surveys, economic 
development, and anti-piracy operations. First, the DCoC and CMF are highly 
involved in training of maritime security personnel, naval forces, and civilian 
personnel involved in the management of maritime resources. The Naval Institute of 
Educational and training Institute of India and the Marine science Academy of Saudi 
Arabia have contributed immensely in training the African nations under the DCoC 
(Geiß & Petrig, 2011). The DCoC has also been in highly involved in enhancing the 
hydrographic capabilities of its African members. This is being achieved through 
regional and international cooperation involving countries such as Japan and India. 
Hydrographic partnership already exists between India and DCoC’s signatories such 
as a Tanzania, Mauritius, Kenya, Mozambique, and Seychelles. In regards to increase 
security around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, the CMF continue to 
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carry out anti-piracy and anti-robbery operations (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). The WIO 
and the Gulf of Aden are key routes for the international trade, with an estimated value 
of trillions of dollars annually.  The Combined Maritime Force has continued to 
conduct anti-piracy operations since the past decade. Apart from the continuous 
patrols, the naval forces under CMF also help to escort large ships across the armed 
robbery and piracy hotspots along the Gulf of Aden. Not a single ship has been robbed 
or hijacked since the CMF increased its operations in the region. The DCoC has also 
played a significant role in continued development of ports as part of enhancing 
maritime diplomacy. The CMF have also increased their visits and monitoring of ports 
within the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, especially Indian Ocean Island 
and East African states. The increased operations have helped to boost greater synergy 
and inter-operability between the coast guards of individual countries and the CMF 
(Kraska & Pedrozo, 2013). The consistent port monitoring also shows CMF’s 
willingness to enhance the development of blue economy of its signatory states. 
2.1.6.2 The Role of DCoC in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
The Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is an important territory for the world 
maritime industry since it serves the Middle East, Asia and Africa. The complexity of 
the WIO and the Gulf of Aden’s maritime sector has attracted different challenges, 
including difficulties associated with dealing with the busy transport sector, armed 
robbery and piracy against ships (Geiß & Petrig, 2011). This has created the need for 
strong partnership between the various players involved in the maritime industry. 
Furthermore, the transnational nature of maritime crimes such as drug and human 
trafficking makes it important for regional and international cooperation. The fact that 
individuals perpetrate crimes in the region and groups from different countries, 
together with the fact that hijacked vessels are taken to different jurisdiction, demands 
that countries within the WIO and the Gulf of Aden collaborate with other countries 
to minimize or even stop such crimes (Kraska & Pedrozo, 2013). Bearing in mind all 
problems that the region faces in addressing the transnational illicit and criminal 
activities, being a signatory to DCoC is important. Importantly, being a signatory to 
DCoC has provided the countries with a model for preparedness and for effective 
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response to armed robbery, piracy, environmental pollution, human trafficking, arm 
smuggling, and illegal fishing, among others. 
 
To begin, being members of the DCoC, countries in WIO and the Gulf of Aden has 
been able to communicate and share intelligence, which has been fundamental in 
reducing criminal attacks in ships. More so, being a signatory of DCoC, these countries 
continue to get assistance in investigating, arresting, and charging of culprits of 
maritime crimes in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. This has increased 
security and safety of vessels and crews involved in the international trade(Geiß & 
Petrig, 2011). Overall, the DCoC has been critical to the region by increasing 
partnership among member countries. The Djibouti code of conduct has facilitated 
efforts to reduce the occurrence and scope of the transnational crimes, translating to 
improved business environment for member nations. With the corridor being a vital 
maritime transport hub, the sound trade environment has increased the value of 
maritime resources, which is important for the continued development of the blue 
economy. Therefore, members of the DCoC have started to earn additional millions of 
dollars from the shipping industry, oil business, fishing, and even tourism (Geiß & 
Petrig, 2011). The safe shipping environment has also contributed to the increased 
import of important foods and industrial raw materials, a reality that continue to 
enhance the economic, social and political power of the countries in the region. 
According to the Indian Ocean Commission (2019), the Djibouti Code of Conduct has 
in particular facilitated the training of officials from the member states in regards to 
security, safety issues, and protection of the maritime environment for sustainable blue 
economy development. DCoC-based education and training encompass taking the 
officials through rigorous techniques to equip them with the skills to identify and 
address illicit and criminal activities in their maritime territories (Indian Ocean 
Commission, 2019). This has increased the preparedness of the stakeholders in the 
relevant nations to tackle different challenges, which has helped to increase efficiency 
in response to attacks. Additionally, adopting and implementing the maritime security 
model created by the DCoC, signatory states has further been able to expand their 
maritime legislations to facilitate easy and smooth sharing of information, arrest and 
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prosecution of maritime criminals (Devakumar, 2017). Generally, the code has been 
critical in improving legislations of member states, especially in regards to human 
trafficking, illegal fishing, armed robbery and piracy at sea. 
 
2.1.6.3 CMF’s Role in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
The Combined Maritime Force is based on partnership among different States with the 
goal of preventing piracy, maritime terrorism, promoting a sound maritime 
environment, and enhancing collaboration among members. The CMF is led by the 
United States, Canada and the European Union, among other allies with the main goal 
of securing international maritime territories around the horn of Africa and related 
nations. Three regional task forces make up the CMF, including CTF 150, CTF 151, 
and CTF 152, which are charged with counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and security 
missions around the Gulf, respectively (Holmes, 2011). Through the CMF framework, 
different nations have provided resources to be used in security operations in the 
Western Indian Ocean, the red sea, the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden, among 
other hot spot areas. The CMF’s responsibility in the WIO and the Gulf of Aden is 
mainly that of fighting armed robbery and piracy against maritime vessels, especially 
the large ships that for years has been targeted by Somali pirates. In fact, most maritime 
problems in the region are associated with insurgencies groups such as Alshabab who 
conduct armed robbery and piracy for financial reasons. 
 
The CMF has also helped to reduce terrorism attacks by rebel groups such as the 
Houthi around the Gulf of Aden. The counter-armed robbery, terrorism and piracy 
operations by the member states are aligned to CMF’s responsibility to counter and 
prevent such criminal activities (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). The success of the naval 
forces, which are derived from different signatories, is based on effective and timely 
sharing of intelligence under the CMF guidelines. Furthermore, the capacity of the 
CMF members to counter attacks has been enhanced in the last decade through 
capacity building efforts provided under the CMF framework (Kraska & Wilson, 
2009). Therefore, based on the increased collaboration, members of the CMF in WIO 
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and the Gulf of Aden are guaranteed a decrease in the number of threats caused by 
terrorists, pirates, and illicit fishers, since security has become a responsibility of all 
signatories of DCoC and CMF.  Overall, CMF continue to play a critical function in 
ensuring stability and security in the shipping industry, translating to economic 
stability and growth in the area. 
 
2.2 Combating maritime Insecurity: Operational concept 
Having a legal structure alone is not enough to ensure maritime security, especially 
when dealing with illicit and criminal activities such as piracy at sea. Furthermore, 
legislations only create a ground to address different issues thus a mode of 
implementing the legislation framework is critical. The combined task force provides 
both the framework to detect, safeguard, and respond to the security risks. According 
to Devakumar (2017), operational responses to insecurity and other challenges facing 
the maritime sector requires personnel and technical resources to facilitate close watch, 
monitoring and control measures within the affected area. Considering these factors in 
operational responses and bearing in mind the nature of the risks to maritime security 
against ships, elements of risk management such as preparedness, mitigation, 
prevention, and recovery are vital. This makes the Combined Maritime Force effective 
when responding to these illicit and illegal activities within the WIO and the Gulf of 
Aden (Devakumar, 2017). Therefore, the four elements of risk management should 
create the reference point or ground for effective response to armed robbery and piracy 
at sea. In regards to readiness or preparedness, the capacity of the signatory states to 
respond to insecurities at sea is enhanced through consistent training. This ensures that 
the members can identify and raise alarm before the occurrence of the crime. The 
readiness measures under the CMF are based on partnership and joint coordination 
among members (Benbow, 2015). The availability of equipment, work force, and 
technical platforms is critical to ensure coordinated identification, monitoring and 
management of the illicit or criminal activities. 
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Training also contributes immensely to the success of CMF since it provides the much-
needed skilled work force. Mitigation and prevention of security risks at sea is the core 
function of CMF. Steps are taken early enough to discourage and deter illicit and 
criminal activities within the maritime territories (Benbow, 2015). Response to 
incidences of maritime crime involves immediate or ongoing operations depending on 
the nature and scope of the incidences in play. The CMF starts by creating an 
operational plan to rescue the crew of ship, apprehend the criminals, and transport 
them ashore for legal action and medical attention (Benbow, 2015).  On the other hand, 
post incident reaction is aimed at restoring the situation to the same or even better 
situation than it was before the insecurity incidences. This also involves post 
management of the ship and the affected crew to ensure that they return safely offshore 
and to their respective countries (Devakumar, 2017). Generally, the goal of an 
operational response to insecurity at sea against ship is to establish, the necessarily 
plan to create awareness and facilitate easier and faster detection of risks. This includes 
putting in place the needed resources to deal with these risks, to deter and minimize 















3. Results and Analysis 
 
3.1 Comparative analysis of DCoC and CMF 
Insecurity in the maritime territories has existed for centuries, but the 21st century has 
experienced a significant increase in armed robbery and piracy against ships traversing 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Insecurity has destabilizing impacts 
on corporations, governments, and the overall region. Initially, the region had to rely 
on the global agreements established in the 20th century, despite the continued 
evolution of maritime crimes. Additionally, the fight against armed robbery, piracy, 
and other illicit activities at sea is grounded on legislations created during the 1980s 
that continue to be updated to match the present situation and diverse locations. DCoC 
and CMF agreements have particularly become important in combating insecurity 
within the region around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.  This part 
outlines and analysis the success and challenges of the Djibouti Code of conduct and 
the Combined Maritime Forces in their efforts to combat insecurity in the Western 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden since their inception.  
 
3.1.1 Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) 
The Combined Maritime Force comprises of 30 signatory states and is aimed at 
enhancing the stability, security and overall growth of the covered regions and member 
states. The force cover and estimated area of more than 2 million square miles within 
the International waters. CMF is led by the Vice Admiral of the United States Navy 
while the Commodore of the Royal Navy (RN) serves as the deputy leader (Combined 
Maritime Forces, 2019). The CMF is made up of three units: the counter piracy (CTF-
151), the Arabian Gulf security and cooperation (CFT-152), and counter terrorism 
(CTF-150). The operations of the CTF-152 are mainly concentrated within the Arabian 
Gulf, while the CTF-151 AND CTF-152 operates the area from the Suez Canal all the 
way to the south of the Indian Ocean. The treaty leading to the formation of the CMF 
does not make it compulsory for members to take part in its operations, but members 
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can volunteer. The Combined Maritime Force was created under the United Nations 
Security Council resolution of 2010, commonly known as (UNSCR1373 (2) (Elgort et 
al., 2012). Policy makers and experts have since 2006 been involved in different areas 
of the force as it continues to reinvent its tactics. A majority of these experts have 
highlighted absence of documentation, which makes it difficult to analyse its 
operations. 
 
3.1.1.1 CTF-151 and counter Piracy 
The continued political volatility and instability in the region around the Somalia 
waters since the 1990s has created motivations and an environment that around piracy 
to thrive. After periodic armed robbery and piracy attacks in the beginning of the 
2000s, criminals from the Somali territory started to capture and hold ships and crew 
in ransom successfully, especially in 2005. These attacks eventually led to the 2008’s 
establishment of the UNSCR 1816, which allowed foreign naval ships to carry out 
operations within the Somali territorial waters and surrounding regions. The United 
Nations resolution also allowed the combined naval forces to use all force necessarily 
to deal with illicit crimes in the area. Different groups came forward to help, leading 
to the establishment of the CTF-151 of the Combined Maritime Forces in 2009. In the 
August of 2009, NATO conducted 508 patrols within the region as part of the 
Operation Ocean Shield. In 2008, the EUNAVFOR under the European Union Naval 
Forces conducted operation Atalanta, which led to the rescue of several hostages 
(Riddervold, 2018). 
 
Historical data and computer simulation have evidently contributed immensely to the 
successful operations of CMF via forecasting of areas under high risk of piracy attacks, 
definition of force operation areas, weather conditions and density of ship traffics, and 
spatial analysis of ongoing piracy attacks in the International Recognized Transit areas 
(IRTC). Simple simulations are done to determine the size of the patrol areas 
(Laxhammar & Falkman, 2010). This approach is mainly grounded on the need for 
exposure of the operation area to dense military resources to intervene during 
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problematic time effectively. The operations often involve the naval ships receiving a 
signal or call from a maritime vessel under distress, then sending the message to the 
helicopters that always on standby. Upon arriving at the scene, the helicopter or the 
warships give warning shots that enough to prevent the attack. The size of the 
operation areas allows the responding helicopter to arrive at the area of distress within 
less than an hour after the alert call. The naval ships are usually used to cut off the 
vessels used by the criminals. Unfortunately, most of the operations conducted by the 
CMF go unreported and sometimes undocumented for public consumption. 
 
The limited documentation of patrols in this area are found under the NATO center for 
Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE). The decrease in illicit activities in 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has been associated with a number of 
factors including the existence of EUNAVFOR, the adoption of Best Management 
Practices (BMP) by merchant ships, NATO and the operations of CMF (Riddervold, 
2018). The CMF has increased its security forces around the Somali territories, which 
is also characterized by empowerment of coast guard through increased arming and 
training. Evidently, a majority of the sources of insecurity remains, and naval presence 
is slowly decreasing. For instance, the CMF only deploys patrol vessels less frequently 
today compared to the period before 2013. During the absence of surface military 
vessels, maritime operations helicopters fly sorties while systems to counter-piracy 
partners and situational alert models continue to exist, especially due to the political 
volatility in Somalia (Laxhammar & Falkman, 2010). Therefore, the CMF has to 
continue monitoring the region within the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, 
especially when it comes to examining the conditions facilitating the periodic 
reoccurrence of insecurity.  
 
3.1.1.2 CTF-150 and Maritime Security 
Assessing the overall success of the operations of CTF-150 is quite difficult, 
considering its main goal of enhancing maritime security, prevent and prohibit of the 
utilization of maritime territories for terrorism activities. CMF has opened up on its 
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plan to shape situations ashore as one way of dealing with illicit activities at sea 
(Combined Maritime Forces, 2020). This including moving some of its patrols, 
including weapons and personnel on land to counter criminals before they enter the 
maritime vessel pathways. Recently, the most apparent element of this plan has been 
the outlawing of large maritime transportation of hashish and heroin. Their linkage to 
the financing of terrorist activities has mainly informed the banning of large shipment 
of narcotics within Somalia and surrounding areas. The movement of weapons meant 
to support terrorism activities in the area is also of great concern (Morash, 2004). 
 
The United Nations has identified the smuggling and export of charcoal within the 
East African region as one of the sources of funding for maritime crimes. A major 
beneficiary of the illicit activities is the Al Shabaab, a terrorism group that is greatly 
rooted in Somalia (Devakumar, 2017). The CTF-150 has made multiple seizures of 
narcotics along the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, particularly around the 
Hash Highway and Smack Track as illustrated by figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2. Operation area for Combined Maritime Forces  
Source: http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/  
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A significant amount of narcotics originating from Afghanistan and other Middle East 
nation often finds their way in ships travelling along the Western Indian Ocean and 
Gulf of Aden regions, especially around the Makran Coast and later transferred to 
smaller boats. The heroin is usually destined for East Africa and later smuggled into 
Europe and the United States while Hash is meant for the nations around the Arabian 
Peninsula (Ece, 2015). Since its creation, the Combined Maritime Force has seized 
tones of the illegal drugs as illustrated by figure 3 below.  
 
Figure 3. Drug seizures by CMF 
Source: http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/  
 
Whereas the rise in seizures is part of the approach by CMF to enhance maritime 
security in the region, the typical assessment of the real effectiveness of CMF in line 
with these seizures is still difficult. Probably, the main idea in regards to the 
effectiveness of the combined force is grounded on its ability to minimize narcotic 
business in the region through its periodic operations (Riddervold, 2018). Figure 4 and 
figure 5 below compares data originating from UNODC, which is the department of 
United Nations, charged with the responsibility of dealing with production of narcotics 
and drug-related crime and data from the CMF. It is vital to note that only the data 
involving the tracking of heroin and opium from the Afghanistan is readily available, 
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hence the reason for considering it. Generally, the overall size of the heroin captured 
within the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have reduced by 50 percent 
since increased operations by CMF between 2009 and 2012 (Benbow, 2015). 
However, the tones of drugs intercepted during CMF operations have increased 
significantly. Whereas the general picture is quite concerning, there is evidence that 
the presence of CMF in the region has had a significant positive impact in reducing 
the frequency of drug trade. Additionally, the extent of criminal activity disruptions 
by CMF in the region has grown by up to 15 times from the average of 20 kg to 300 
kg (Clark, 2006). 
 




Figure 5. narcotics and drug-related crime and data from the CMF 
Source: http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/ 
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Several factors should be considered when assessing the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the seizures carried by the Combined Maritime Force in order to increase accuracy 
of the findings. The model used by the UNODC to measure the overall narcotic 
production is vital, however, determining the amount of revenue from narcotics that is 
used to fund piracy and other maritime crimes require more data from law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies (Benbow, 2015). This also includes estimating the 
proportion of narcotics and other illicit drugs that reaches overseas through land, which 
is very difficult. Although there is no doubt that patrols by CMF may be helping to 
deter illicit activities in western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, the continued civil 
wars characterized by political conflict around Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia has 
also played a significant role (Benbow, 2015). The regular mass movement of refugees 
within the region led to increased security within borders, which made the routes less 
attractive to terrorists and maritime criminals. The 2015 Afghanistan Opium Survey 
by the UN provides evidence of how tighter border control may have shaped the 
behaviours of pirates, smugglers, and armed robbers (Devakumar, 2017). It is also 
important to take into account other measures being taken by the CMF that could have 
contributed to reduced insecurity with the area under study. For example, it is 
important to consider the amount seized and frequency of seizures in a given period or 
number of operations in a certain area. It also possible to even arriving at a significantly 
precise measure. 
 
3.1.2 Recent successful CMF Operations 
In the first half of 2010, the 150 unit of the Combine Task Force carried out a security 
operation in the Bab AL Mandab sea regions of the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden. The maritime security operation resulted to major success for the CTF 
150 and the overall CMF in building of maritime Pattern of Life (POL) (Combined 
Maritime Force, 2020). Joint forces from the United States and the United Kingdom 
together with Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA) and German Maritime Patrol were 
critical factor in this achievement. Apart from the regional engagement, more 
emphasis was put in the gathering of data in regards to maritime pattern of life, 
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enhancing partnership with stakeholders in Yemen and using the information provided 
by the Yemen Naval officials on maritime environment and related local issues 
(Combined Maritime Force, 2020). The security operation also involved engagement 
with war vessels from the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) by two ships, HMS 
Makkah and HMS Riyadh. The maritime security operation carried to reinforce the 
key elements of violent extremism, human smuggling, anti-terrorism, illegal trade, and 
narcotic smuggling, among other illicit activities. Key officials from the CTF 150 unit 
also toured Yemen to meet key military figures such as Major General Ahmed Ali Al-
Ashwai to enhance the regional activities of CTF 150 (Combined Maritime Force, 
2020). As a multidimensional team, one of the CTF 150 main responsibilities is to 
implement counter-terrorism activities on the high waters. It executes security 
operations in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and 
the Gulf of Oman.  
 
At the end of 2018, a sub-unit of theCTF-150 called the HMS Dragon carried out the 
biggest drug bust since the creation of the Combined Maritime Forces. The operation 
led to the seizure and destruction of almost 10000 kilograms of illegal drugs being 
ferried in small boats within the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
(Combined Maritime Force, 2020). Without the operation by the CMF, the narcotics, 
which are estimated at more than 5 million pounds, could have been sold to the locals 
in the region. The profits from such illegal activities could have further been used to 
fund terrorism and different organized crimes (Combined Maritime Force, 2020). The 
HMS unit is headed by Commodore Darren Garnier from the Canadian Navy, who for 
years has helped to conduct successful security operations and patrol in the East 
African and Middle Eastern areas of the WIO and the Gulf of Aden. The capture and 
destruction of these drugs are helping to reduce the financial capacity of criminals and 
terrorists. Nevertheless, it has been easy for the Combined Maritime Forces during 
these operations since they have to deal with bad weather and highly armed criminals 
with good knowledge of the area. The task force uses Wildcat helicopter to carry the 
captured narcotics to the CMF war vessels (Combined Maritime Force, 2020). The 
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helicopter does not only help to speed up the process of transporting the drugs but also 
in the recovery of Royal marines and sailors working with the HMS Dragon sub-unit. 
 
3.1.3 CMF and Force Flow 
Force flow denotes the number of maritime vessels linked to each unit of the CMF in 
a single day. Considering that signatories to the CMF provide their support on a 
voluntary basis, force flow usually acts as a metric for determining the commitment of 
the CMF signatories. The number of assets of a given country is calculated in terms of 
the assets available at a given day, and assessed frequently through the Effectiveness 
Assessment Campaigns (Devakumar, 2017). Documentation and reporting is done for 
every vessel including its country of origin, which allows for further analysis of the 
resources available to the CMF. However, the assessment of the force flow is 
complicated by the problems associated with determining the value of each asset due 
to varying size and regularity of operation or availability for use by the task force. The 
contributions of some nations using other resources other than vessels hinder fair 
assessment of the relative effectiveness of the CMF, especially due to the voluntary 
clause. Therefore, maritime security scholars and experts have examined the force 
flow data through simplistic approaches in relation to the operations of the CMF (Papa 
et al., 2015). Therefore, the results of the effectiveness of CMF based on the force flow 
can be measured using two approaches. 
 
The first approach focuses on the number of resources provided by each member using 
some modifier or multiplier to show their capacity. The other approach replaces the 
resources with the size covered by the CMF security patrols. Unfortunately, the first 
approach is difficult to implement because it requires one to develop multipliers for 
assessing the relative capacity that is both fair and satisfactory. The multipliers must 
also take into account all the situations involved (Pallotta et al., 2013).  For the second 
approach, one proposal is to determine the number of hours used in operations in each 
given area. Whereas combined task forces are not always carrying out patrols, they 
often prioritize certain areas. The second approach is less complex to use. 
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that the approach will yield fair result since different 
vessels may have outrageously varying sensor ranges between them and aircrafts 
(Pallotta et al., 2013). The approach also does not take into account the gap between a 
vessel that is in active operation and high-speed vessels transiting via the region. For 
instance, figure 6 capture vessels conducting CFT-150-related operations in a 
particular day, encompassing an Australian replenishment vessel, a USN guided-
missile destroyer, an RN air - defence destroyer, a US Coast Guard Cutter, and USN 
patrol boat. It is evident that these assets in form of patrol vessels hold varying 
capabilities (Melvin, 2019). 
 
Figure 6. Vessels conducting CFT-150-related operations 
Source: http://www.combinedmaritimefirces.com/  
 
Therefore, like the DCoC, the CMF should find areas where partnership between 
countries can take place such as blue economy for sustainable security. According to 
Benbow (2015), although most of CMF’s activities are based on security operations 
of the combined naval forces, substantial operations in regards to governance should 
also be carries out in order to ensure sustainable growth, without compromising on 
environment and economic health (Pallotta et al., 2013). Activities relating to the blue 
economy, including those that involve preserving the marine environment by working 
with the local fishermen and neighbouring communities usually help to enhance 
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maritime security. Although a number of stakeholders, including the African Union, 
have consistently focused on the relationship between the blue economy and the 
maritime security, the CMF appear to treat them separately (Melvin, 2019). Dealing 
with insecurities at sea, safeguarding the marine environment, and extracting the 
maritime resources in a sustainable way is dependent in clear understanding of all 
dimensions of the maritime sector. 
 
For instance, research on fishing trends and marine life carried out in the recent years 
by different environmental agencies has provided important insights into the different 
spheres of maritime. These studies are important in identifying anomalies at sea 
(Melvin, 2019). Therefore, it is important for the CMF to adopt a working plan to bring 
together environmental agencies and coastal communities for effective eradication of 
illicit and illegal activities that contribute to insecurity at sea. For instance, the area of 
fisheries and the interests of different countries have often let to conflicts due to the 
economic and environmental issues involved. Enhancing the ties between 
environmental, security and development experts has a higher chance facilitating the 
growth of blue economy, environmental conservation, and overall maritime security. 
 
3.2 The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct is part of the team that is fully involved in the 
development and implementation of frameworks to increase the capacity to prevent 
and fight insecurity in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. According to 
IMO, the DCoC has at least 20 signatories from the region (Hensel, 2017). However, 
like CMF, the DCoC also depends on the goodwill and cooperation of its member 
nations in security efforts. Usually, the DCoC is heavily involved in ensuring 
cooperation, coordination and communication among signatories, which are also 
strongly aligned to its key founding principles. These key principles include 
strengthening of national laws, training, developing capacity, and sharing of 
intelligence both regionally and nationally. DCoC has also developed strong technical 
partnership with the International Maritime Organization (IMO). This partnership has 
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been effective in increasing trust among members and abilities of DCoC to counter 
insecurity in the region, especially armed robbery and piracy. The Djibouti Code of 
Conduct prioritizes capacity building as a key instrument in the fights against armed 
robbery and piracy in the area. 
 
As a result, sharing of intelligence, governance, and training are implemented in 
different ways to build a strong model of countering insecurity. Additionally, the 
partnership between DCoC and IMO has led to the establishment of a regional training 
center, which is currently situated in Djibouti. The training center was built using 
donor funds with Japan being the main contributor. Even the training facilitated by the 
DCoC is carried out under joint efforts of multiple International organizations 
including East African Standby Forces (EASF), European Union and NATO (Hensel, 
2017). Evidently, training as a capacity building tool has been effective in reducing 
piracy activities in the area around the Somali territorial waters. The Code has ensured 
that the security efforts are in line with the local legislations of the member states, 
including the classification of illegal and criminal activities at sea. This form of 
empowerment allows individual governments to carryout independent investigations 
and charges the perpetrators in their court systems following the global standards 
outlined by IMO. The intelligence sharing facilities are situated in Dar-AL-Salaam, 
Mombasa and Sanaa (Siebels, 2019). These enters are fully equipped to enhance 
collaboration between international and local naval networks and forces. The 
development and implementation of different security missions are also coordinated 
through the facilities. Hence, empowerment of individual states plays a central role in 
security efforts. 
 
3.2.1 DCoC Mandate in the region 
The mandate of the DCoC is based on the guidelines provided by IMO, and the nations 
around the Western Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf are parties to the IMO 
agreements. Consequently, DCoC-related capacity building is carried out via IMO’s 
Technical Cooperation Committee (TCC) and Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). 
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Countries in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden leverages in this 
cooperation and takes part in different ways to strengthen local maritime legislations 
and ensure their implementation. For instance, countries such as Djibouti and Kenya 
have continuously updated their maritime laws to match the updated Code to improve 
their counter-insecurity measures and enlarge to cover more areas of illicit and 
criminal activities including illegal fishing and human trafficking. The capacity 
building under DCoC, especially via training integrates different international tools. 
East African nations through their various Marine Science and Security centers have 
benefited from the DCoC led maritime security activities and training. The training 
provides via the partnership between IMO and DCoC aligns with the global metrics, 
which helps to adhere to the international standards. Part of the training activities 
includes security responses such as investigations and prosecution as outlined by 
DCoC and through the existing national laws. 
Evidently, signatories of the DCoC also takes part in different conferences and 
workshops geared towards enhancing the process of implementing security at sea 
legislations organized by DCoC. Indeed, the signatory states applies the training 
offered during these meetings to strength local security efforts and also increase their 
overall efficiency in maritime management. For example, almost all nations around 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden such as Saudi Arabia and Kenya have 
established Commercial Maritime legislations to guide their maritime activities and 
oversee different entities involved in sea activities. Different countries are also taking 
part in different operations of the DCoC depending in individual interests and needs. 
For instance, India and Saudi Arabia have been heavily involved in sponsoring training 
of African Countries. The DCoC also gives mandate to specific nations to help create 
or enhance the maritime security preparedness of other signatories.  The preparedness 
include investigation at sea procedures, interdiction activities and technical training. 
The International Maritime Organization is also actively involved in the organization 
and sponsorship of these programs. Therefore, countries with higher capacity hold 
higher position at DCoC and IMO in terms of spearheading security programs and 
efforts. Overall, the DCoC has helped to increase the capacity of members in Western 
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Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden to investigate, deter, arrest and charge criminal 
and illicit activities at sea including human and drug trafficking, piracy, illegal fishing, 
and armed robbery, among others. 
 
3.3 The Effectiveness of CMF Compared to DCoC against insecurity 
Both the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Combined Maritime Force have played a 
critical role in the fight against insecurity in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of 
Aden. However, the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) has played a greater role in 
combating piracy and armed robbery that had increased significantly in the last decade. 
First, unlike the DCoC, the CMF has an active naval force derived from different 
countries across the globe. Additionally, the CMF’s operations are supported and led 
by key international players such as the United States, Canada, and the European 
Union. On the other hand, signatories of the DCoC are derived from Africa and the 
Middle East hence lacks the same resources in terms of work force and funding 
enjoyed by the CMF (Siebels, 2019). The CMF memberships have developed an 
ownership element whereby any country or organization in the world can take part in 
the implementation of the agreement. The developed nations such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom are greatly involved in ensuring that commercial ships 
involved in the international trade are protected against armed robbery and piracy, 
among other criminal activities. The less developed members are not obligated to 
contribute funds or personnel since the entire arrangement is based on voluntary basis. 
The European Union and United States have provided naval hardware and technology, 
which has come in hand in combating insecurity around the Somalia corridor. The 
funding from the developed and developing economies such as Japan, India, and 
Denmark have helped to promote security and ensure sustainability of CMF’s 
operations. Most of these funds have been used not only to fund security drills across 
the region but also in developing and running intelligence collection centers. 
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3.4 Legal Challenges 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the sea (UNCLOS) is largely involved 
in ensuring security at sea through efforts aimed at curbing human trafficking, piracy, 
armed robbery, environmental degradation, and illegal fishing, among others. 
However, the scope of maritime security means that UNCLOS cannot successes alone. 
Additionally, providing a legal framework is not enough in fighting insecurity at sea. 
Therefore, UNCLOS has provided guidelines and support for local, regional and 
international treaties in relation to maritime security. There are multiple treaties even 
at the international levels. Although the body encompass multiple clauses involving 
how states deals with maritime insecurity such as Articles 107, 110 and 100, the body 
has failed to provide clear guidance or reference point for private firms involved in the 
fight against maritime crimes. In reality, this has led to creation of multiple fragmented 
legal principles, conventions, and agreements that narrows down to UNCLOS. Despite 
the UNCLOS establishing a still legal foundation of maritime jurisdiction and areas, 
the framework is blind to some non-state maritime security operations, especially 
those relating to piracy.  
 
In its place, a set of confusing, overlapping, and often conflicting local and 
international standards, laws, and policies have come up in effort to regulate the 
industry. According to the United Nations, the rigidity of UNCLOS is deliberate to 
provide a solid legal ground. Despite this reason, having a dynamic legal framework 
is important to ensure that it adapts to the rapidly shifting maritime environment. The 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 
Protocol was created to bridge the gaps in the international legislations needed to 
reduce or eliminate threats to security of navigation, commerce and human life at sea. 
The protocol requires governments to develop laws against terrorism and piracy 
activities based on the national legislations. The SUA protocol is based on the 1988 
and 2005 frameworks. The 1988 version maintain that countries hold the responsibility 
to create jurisdiction to charge or extradite perpetrators of maritime crimes even when 
the crimes were carried out outside their territorial waters. 
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Different from the UNCLOS view of piracy that just emphasizes on the high waters 
and hence merely permits security reactions in the high waters, the 1988 framework 
illegalizes piracy-like acts against ships that have travelled away from the territorial 
water are planned to travel beyond the jurisdiction. A major limitation of the 1988 
SUA framework is that it only gives flag states the needed power to react to threats 
against ships displaying their specific flag. The SUA framework of 2005 is an 
amendment to that of 1988 and covers three areas including the use of vessels as means 
of conducting maritime crimes. It also covers the production of dangerous weapons on 
international waters. The third section covers the transportation of suspects of 
terrorism in high waters under the anti-terrorism laws of the United Nations. More so, 
the 2005 version extended the jurisdiction of states to encompass third states against 
the previous version that only included the flag states. 
 
Therefore, the new version has broadened the scope of defining criminal activities 
against ships beyond UNCLOS, expanding the legal latitude of nations to pursue 
perpetrators and reduce attacks at sea. Clearly, having a wider perspective of the SUA 
protocol it is clear that it emphasizes on the need for treaties against maritime threats. 
The guidelines and protocols for private measures against maritime insecurity are 
based on IMO instruments including SOLAS. The safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) Convention, was created in the 1910s to enhance the safety of maritime 
vessels after the Titanic situation. The Convention provides the best practice in the 
construction and operations of ships for increased safety. The SOLAS’ control 
standards are compulsory for both port and flag states. However, SOLAS has also 
created a legal dilemma when dealing with private security at sea. First, there is a 
question of whether having private or independent contractors on board ships limits 
the overall obligation of the ship owners under the Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS 
convention. This has left individual States to establish additional legislations to guide 
the relationship between these private personnel and the ship owners or organizations. 
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For instance, the Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO), which is one of the 
main shipping associations in the world, has designed guidelines for contract in order 
to create boundaries between the obligations of ship owners against private security 
contractors. Although SOLAS has detailed the responsibilities of ship owners when it 
comes to flag states, a majority of cases involving private security firms has shown 
that they tend to ignore the orders or guidelines of the ship-owners when faced by 
dangerous situations. Instead, the private firms focus on defending their lives and that 
of the crewmembers, which is aright guaranteed in various international legal 
frameworks including the Human Right Charter. The guidelines provided by BIMCO 
under GUARDCON strive to remove this dilemma by providing a contract between 
ship owners and independent contractors. This include allowing the private contractors 
to react to situations with necessarily taking orders from the ship owners and to reduce 
the liability of the ship-owners in case the private contractors’ acts are in violation of 
the SOLAS protocol. Additionally, SOLAS has given port states the mandate to block 
maritime vessels from sailing when safety is in doubt in order to protect property, 
crew, and the marine environment. The SOLAS convention continues to be expanded 
for increased maritime security through individual regulations, including ISM and 
ISPS, among others. 
 
In conclusion, the global legislation framework provides detailed clauses to deal with 
maritime insecurity in areas such as piracy, human and drug trafficking, illegal fishing, 
production and use of weapons of mass destruction, and armed robbery, among others. 
Regardless of the notable limitations that could create legal dilemma, the global 
agreements and recommendations creates a good ground when creating more specific 
or customized regional and local legislations. One of the key sources of the regional 
and local legislations is the International Maritime Organization (IMO) since it 
contains specific clauses relating to maritime safety and security, including dealing 
with armed robbery and piracy against ships. Nevertheless, other agreements and 
protocols such as UNCLOS, SUA, HC, and OCC can be used to deal with armed 
robbery, piracy and terrorism at sea based on specific provisions. The International 
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legislation gives countries or States, power to identity and maritime offense, illegalize 
it, and prosecute perpetrators. The international legal framework also provides 
procedures in relation to the implementation measures, global collaboration, 





























The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been playing a critical role in 
establishing guidelines and recommendations for maritime activities and for its 
members. In regards to maritime insecurity affecting ships, it has created 
recommendations and tools that can aid in the operational response in areas such as 
minimization of risk and information acquisition in the fight against armed robbery, 
piracy, and other criminal activities at sea. IMO has facilitated the creation of different 
maritime cooperation agreements as part of the efforts to combat insecurity. Initially, 
countries relied on the law of the sea and individual government efforts to deal with 
these insecurities. Notably, a few decades ago, criminal and illicit activities such as 
piracy and human trafficking occurred on small scale so it was easier for individual 
governments to deal with them at a local level.  However, the rapid globalization and 
entry of more sophisticated criminal groups has increased the need for collaboration 
both at the national, regional, and international levels to curb insecurities at sea. The 
maritime vessels affected by criminal activities, particularly armed robbery and piracy 
are those transporting valued goods including rare minerals and crude oil. Any attack 
on these vessels is likely to cause immense economic losses to the stakeholders. This 
has given birth to collaboration agreements and security operations such as DCoC and 
the CMF. The important of the DCoC and CMF as security instruments has been 
evident due to their success in reducing piracy and armed robbery incidence in Western 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. 
 
4.1 Robustness of DCoC 
The DCoC has cemented cooperation among the different states within the Western 
Indian Ocean. Apart from IMO, the African Union, INTERPOL, the European Union, 
the UN Offices on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the African regional economic 
communities, among others, also support the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Under the 
guidance of DCoC, all the signatories have established facilities to increase their 
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capacity to deter and respond to maritime insecurity (Weldemichael, 2017).  The goal 
is to have central systems where intelligence related to criminal activities such as 
piracy and drug trafficking can be shared. This intelligence can be assessed and 
evaluated on regional and national levels to facilitate transnational operations and 
related strategic development. Therefore, the initial stage of DCoC involved building 
the capacity of the member states in order to increase maritime safety and security 
under the Critical Maritime Routes program of the European Union (Menzel, 2018). 
The second and ongoing phase of the DCoC is a model of training based on IMO 
guidelines through the Djibouti Regional Center. 
 
One of the main problems affecting the operations of DCoC is the lack of a central 
political body to oversee its activities. This means that the code lacks the necessary 
political good will since it has no political responsibility or mandate against nations in 
the region. This has led to delays in some of its security projects, particularly when 
dealing with uncooperative nations such as Iran (Weldemichael, 2017). To counter this 
problem, the DCoC has recently updated its mandate and security tools. The revision 
covered multiple areas including coordination and partnership in the execution of the 
security tools based on the recommendations of the signatory states. This has increase 
the effectiveness of DCoC as a key security instrument, especially dealing with piracy 
and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Menzel, 2018). 
The Code has succeeded in increasing sharing of information among members and 
increase cooperation between the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. The Code has 
created a strong ground for technical partnership among different parties including 
international bodies, signatory nations, and others. Therefore, DCoC is vigorous in the 
region despite the political and financial challenges. In regards to financial limitation, 
the DCoC often run on a budget of less than 9 million US dollars (Menzel, 2018). The 
budget is too tight considering the extensive security operations needed in the region. 
Additionally, the Code lacks a stable source of income since it has to rely on donor 
funding from nations such as the Netherlands and Japan.  Nevertheless, the DCoC has 
continued to receive substantial support from NATO and the European Union in areas 
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such as training of signatory states, particularly in relation to collection of intelligence, 
arrest, and prosecution of suspects at sea. The commitment of signatory states 
continues to increase, which favours the efforts of the code. For instance, Saudi Arabia 
has contributed in capacity building through its Border Guards Academy dedicated to 
Marine Science and Security, which is dedicated to the entire region. Consequently, 
increased cooperation and support has contributed immensely to strengthening anti-
piracy efforts despite the limited funds. In 2017, the signatory states also made 
important changes to the code to make it more fitted to lead the development of blue 
economy in the region. This includes safeguarding of the marine ecosystem to enhance 
the standards of living of local people and for overall economic development of the 
region. Each signatory state is expected to establish a clear national plan to aid 
maritime security and the growth of blue economy. The goal is to increase stability, 
revenue and creates jobs in the region while ensuring that the marine environment is 
safe and secure in the long-term (Menzel, 2018). The DCoC has shown its robustness 
due to its ability to achieve its mandate despite the myriad of challenges. Therefore, 
the code as a security instrument is not only compatible with the national legislations 
and efforts but also sustainable. 
 
The ability of the code to adapt to future changes is evident from the amendments done 
under the DCoC+. The amendments mean that the code covers more transitional 
crimes at sea including narcotics, human trafficking, illegal dumping of poisonous 
waste, trafficking of arms, illegal wildlife trade, theft, smuggling, and illegal oil 
bunkering, among others. The 2018 Jeddah amendments also reveal the increasing 
importance of DCoC in the region due to its role in curbing crime and other illicit 
activities in the region. 
 
4.2 Robustness of CMF 
The nature of the existing threats to maritime security has evolved over the years. The 
now common threats such as illegal fishing, piracy, smuggling of drugs, armed 
robbery, unregulated fishing, smuggling firearms, and trafficking of immigrants were 
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less rampant before the 21st century. Additionally, the threats were less common 
around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden regions. Hence, a multilateral 
security instrument such as CMF has become necessary in effort to combat these 
threats. CMF provides a more comprehensive approach to achieving security and 
safety at sea both in the local and international waters. The robustness of CMF is 
demonstrated by its founding standards that govern its contracting parties, signatories, 
and other stakeholders. The signatories to CMF are required to align their maritime 
legislations and policies with the basic principles or standards of CMF for sustainable 
outcome. In scenarios where the utilization of the CMF’s standards is not technically 
possible, the CMF agreements appear to provide solutions to help minimize the 
dilemma (Mukherjee, 2020). The CMF covers almost all the criminal and illicit 
activities that may threaten security at sea such as illegal fishing, terrorism, and human 
and arm trafficking.  The continued amendment of the CMF shows that the instrument 
is dynamic and flexible enough to cater for different circumstances as they arise. The 
robustness of the instrument is evident from its framework or design, which is 
characterized by multiple divisions. 
 
The strategy used by the CMF to address insecurity in the Western Indian Ocean and 
the Gulf of Aden is largely sustainable, especially considering that it has its own naval 
forces derived from different parts of the world. Consequently, the CMF is able to 
cover a large scope of the territorial waters of its signatories and the most affected 
areas of the international waters. A good example is CMF’s successful operations 
around the horn of Africa, particularly the Somalia corridor (Vespe et al., 2015). Like 
the DCoC, the CMF is playing a significant role in capacity building and enhancing 
cooperation among nations in the region. Furthermore, CMF has also been able to 
break political barriers by ensuring that even non-members are part of the cooperation 
efforts. This has been every important in fighting piracy and armed robbery, especially 
along the waters of the politically unstable Somalia. Therefore, CMF is not only 
politically and economically robust and capable but also successful at the geographic 
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level as it continues to enhance national and international collaboration against 
criminal and illicit activities (Upadhyaya, 2014). 
 
The multiagency nature of the CMF composition gives it the necessary support needed 
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in curbing maritime insecurities in the region. 
The multiagency network comprises of international organizations, national 
governments, and other bodies. As the signatory government facilitates and provides 
a favourable environment for the implementation of the CMF’s strategies through 
national and regional legislations, the maritime force continues to provide the needed 
capacity for better security outcome. Clearly, the absence of CMF involvement would 
make it almost impossible for individual nations or even the region to counter the 
rapidly evolving armed robbery and pirate activities (Bueger & Stockbruegger, 2016). 
Furthermore, the presence of the combined maritime forces gives the region a technical 
advantage against the heavily armed criminals operating in territorial or around 
territorial maritime environments. For example, despite countries such as Tanzania 
and Somalia being members of the Combined Maritime Force since its creation, their 
contribution in terms of funding has been limited. In fact, most of the African countries 
around the region lack both the funds and skilled personnel to fight criminal and illicit 
activities in their territories. Due to these circumstances, CMF works with elite 
international bodies such as the European Union, NATO, and Interpol to facilitate 
communication in terms of collecting sharing intelligence to enhance maritime 
security (Mukherjee, 2020). Therefore, the strength and effectiveness of CMF is 
evident and its robustness is captured by the significant decrease in piracy and related 
criminal activities. 
 
4.3 DCoC and CMF’s approaches 
DCoC and CMF share multiple goals including combating insecurities at sea due to 
criminal activities such as armed robbery and piracy. Evidently, CMF and DCoC 
provide transnational and regional approaches to combating maritime insecurities 
since they comprise of both local and international governments and bodies. The 
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diverse approach gives them a strong foundation in dealing with armed robbery and 
piracy in Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.  The region had become one of 
the notorious corridors for pirates due to its economic and strategic importance as an 
international trade route, oil production and fishing. The multilateral approach of the 
DCoC and CMF offers a proper framework based on its operations and guidelines on 
how to investigate, process, arrest and prosecute perpetrators of maritime crimes. More 
so, the coordination and joint operations facilitated by the CMF and DCoC goes a long 
way to ensuring that individual states have significant capacity to contribute to the 






















5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
Insecurity in the maritime territories has existed for centuries, but the recent years have 
experienced a significant increase in armed robbery and piracy against ships traversing 
the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Insecurity has destabilizing impacts 
on corporations, governments, and the overall region. Initially, the region had to rely 
on the global agreements established in the 20th century, despite the continued 
evolution of maritime crimes. The Djibouti Code of conduct has provided tool that can 
comprehensively increase capacity of the signatory states to minimize or even 
eliminate insecurity at Sea. Some of the key tools used by DCoC in capacity building 
include intelligence sharing, policies and training. As a result, states within the 
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden can take advantage of DCoC’s experience 
to improve national and regional legislations related to security and safety at Sea. 
Specifically, the countries in region can utilize the different policies established by 
DCoC to either improve or replace their inefficient maritime legislations to help deal 
with the dynamic challenges affecting the maritime industry.  
 
The enhancement of local legislations will help the legislations of signatory states to 
match global standards aimed to safeguard international and territorial waters. 
Ensuring that the local legislations match the international policies will ensure 
effective response to illegal and illicit activities in the region when the laws are 
invoked. This means that the signatories of DCoC in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) 
and the Gulf of Aden can establish their individual procedures without bypassing the 
international requirements. As the global economic environment continues to change, 
various changes at the local level also continue to be experienced. The advancement 
in technology and the ongoing globalization has contributed to increased 
interconnection of regions and people. In the shipping sector, the linkage exists via the 
emergence of technological tools together with globally and locally established 
information sharing areas to enhance security at sea. Consequently, the WIO and the 
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Gulf of Aden should exploit the current instruments and tools provided by both the 
CMF and the DCoC to enhance its maritime polices and laws to match the current and 
emerging security challenges. 
  
Furthermore, the shifts will ensure that the regions are not left behind in relations to 
safeguarding its maritime interests. Hence, the region must use DCoC and CMF as a 
reference point or blueprint in improving its maritime legislations via a strategic 
incorporation. The tools are consistently updated to ensure that current and ongoing 
security issues such as armed robbery and piracy at sea are addressed. The DCoC and 
CMF should also continue to improve the policy structures of the WIO and the Gulf 
of Aden, but based on a careful plan to ensure that political issues do not overtake the 
priorities of security. This will demand increased investment in analytical and 
individual capacities, together with technologies that are likely to fit well in relation 
to the local needs. Considering the unavailability of financial resources, together with 
the increasing interests of global partners, more focus should be on strengthening the 
bargaining power of individual nations through regional cohesion.  
 
Considering the wide scope of the challenges affecting the region, the DCoC and the 
CMF can do more to improve maritime security and safety in the WIO and the Gulf 
of Aden. First, the DCoC and CMF should focus on increasing the Pan-African 
agenda. The two organizations should not only focus on international interests but also 
instead incorporate the priorities and needs of countries in the region. The CMF in 
particular should instead of continuing to fund naval operations should allocations 
towards having strong policies and stable political environment. Therefore, the DCoC 
and CMF needs to refocus, increase commitments, and concentrate on improving the 
living standards of people in the region. This will help minimize the factors such as 
poverty and unequal distribution or maritime income, which pushes people to engage 
in illicit and illegal maritime activities, or political unrest. Clearly, empowering people 
through increased economic participation will be a step in the right direction for CMF 
and DCoC in the region. Secondly, the CMF and DCoC should diversify their 
 53 
strategies when dealing with insecurity in the area. The two bodies have mostly relied 
on information gathering, military operations, and training on various maritime issues. 
For a change, the DCoC should include maritime research, industrial development, 
promoting education and cultural activities, establish best policies for growth of the 
blue economy, and weather and climate change monitoring, and green energy issues. 
Establishing more and non-military operations and working with local government and 
other agencies will make the CMF and DCoC more relevant and effective in the region. 
Creating friendly, accommodative, and supportive links has proved successful in other 
industries.  
 
DCoC has established policies to help its members to develop and increase their 
benefits via the blue economy. However, increased partnership on Blue Economy is 
needed, especially at time when interests on the maritime resources among most 
countries around the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden are increasing. The 
African Union (AU) recently declared the importance of Blue economy in helping 
African Nations to speed-up their development. Additionally, the African Integrated 
Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS) and the 2063 African Union Agenda insist on the 
importance of maritime resources towards the overall local and global economy. The 
Island nations around the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden such as 
Mauritius and Seychelles were listed among the key stakeholders and beneficiaries of 
the blue economy, especially considering that their people derive livelihood from the 
seas. Currently and through the support of the DCoC, countries such as South Africa, 
Kenya, Mauritius and Seychelles have established Ocean guards to safeguard their 
blue economy interests. The blue economy efforts under the DCoC are also grounded 
on mutual partnership among the African littorals. The DCoC and the CMF should 
focus on increasing the capacity of countries in the WIO and Gulf of Aden to use 
innovative technology. This may include wastewater recycling, marine-based green 
energy production, and water reuse, tidal and wave energy production, conversion of 
salty water to drinkable water and sustainable harvesting of nutrient-rich seafoods, and 
sustainable management of the sea ecosystem.  
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One of the clear places where the DCoC and the CMF have succeeded in their efforts 
to increase maritime security in WIO and the Gulf of Aden is in strengthening 
collaboration among countries in the region with the aim of increasing capacity 
building. The networks have the capacity to sustain and improve inter-personal ties in 
the region. Usually, the effect of such networks is long-term and almost impossible to 
measure. Nevertheless, they are critical for the growth of different agencies involved 
in maritime security and related systems. Research on regional cooperation has 
revealed that the importance of interpersonal ties between countries and individuals 
plays a critical role. The education and training provide by different agencies of the 
CMF and DCoC, especially under the guidelines of the International Maritime 
Organization creates intra-regional communities and offer skills on maritime security. 
Such communities may further create environments suitable for integration where 
intelligence can be shared.  
 
Overall, the CMF appears to have been successful in ensuring security in the WIO and 
the Gulf of Aden region through increased strategic naval or military operations while 
the DCoC has been effective by establishing key maritime policies and increasing local 
and regional cooperation. However, to increase their effectiveness, the CMF and 
DCoC should establish multilateral security framework for the region. Increased 
cooperation among the countries in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden 
will help minimize CMF and DCoC’s over reliant on donor funding and political 
goodwill. Establishing a stronger and more local security framework will help not only 
reduce insecurity but also cater for the interests of the signatory states. The CMF and 
DCoC should also build more Information Fusion Centers (IFC-IOR) in the region and 
integrate them with the international centers. This will make the response to insecurity 
more effective and contribute immensely towards attaining Security and Growth in the 
region. The IFC-IOR centers should align their activities with other security 
mechanisms in the region including the Regional Operations Center (RCOC), which 
is currently situated in Seychelles. Countries within the region are also signatories to 
different international maritime organizations and treaties. Overall, all the 
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organizations and treaties are targeted towards reducing the risks of insecurity 
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